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(Received 10 April 2008)
This study is a deep-text analysis of military censorship applied to the national
press in the Sri Lankan conflict. We examine press coverage of two Sri Lankan
military operations, namely Operation Jayasikurui (1997) and the Capture of
Elephant Pass (2000), to identify patterns of signification that help us construct a
novel theory of conflict reporting under censorship within the context of ethnic,
intrastate conflict. Our study shows that Sri Lankan newspapers, while abiding by
censorship regulations, contradictorily also manoeuvred around these regulations
as if censorship did not exist. Noteworthy were the censorship circumvention
techniques that were used. For example, journalists taught readers how to ‘read’
blank space. They used commentary to educate readers how to read the straight
news. They used conflict frames to overcome bias towards official viewpoints.
They used multi-source confirmation to avoid pre-dominance of official views.
They used respectful words rather than demonised opponents. Great attention
was paid to victims of the conflict, destruction of life and property, and civil
society. Our findings do not accord well with previous theoretical models of the
media role in society and of press censorship under conflict. The Sri Lankan press
is highly intertwined within its cultural context and follows its own value system.
We propose the ‘Catherine Wheel Model of Censorship Circumvention’ about
press behaviour in times of internal conflict. Our model attempts to explain
internal conflict within the developing world context in which the press system is
based deeply in culture and is more accustomed to circumventing censorship than
obeying it.
Keywords: critical propaganda theory; Sri Lanka; military censorship; free press;
intrastate conflict; ethnic conflict; culture; language
Introduction
Traditional interstate conflict may be conspicuously rare today, but the reverse is
true of intrastate conflict (also known as internal or ethnic conflict). From Eastern
Europe to Africa and from Latin America to South Asia, intrastate conflict is today
more prevalent than conflict between states. Many authors (e.g. Brown, 2001; Gurr
& Harff, 1995; Horowitz, 1994; Kriesberg, 1994; Rupesinghe, 1987, 1992; Williams,
1994) have listed various causes of intrastate conflicts. Some of the causes actually
have little to due with ethnicity. These include internal conflicts caused by weak
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states, geography, discrimination, ideology, inter-group politics, economic problems,
and modernisation.
Another frequently mentioned cause of intrastate conflict is cultural discrimina-
tion against minorities, including legal and political constraints on the use and
teaching of minority languages (Brown, 2001, pp. 5, 12). Some 40% of the world’s
states have five or more sizable ethnic populations; a mere 20% of states are relatively
ethnically homogenous (Evans, 1994). Minority ethnic populations are growing
rapidly as a consequence of natural population increase and immigration, and
refugee flows are expanding global ethnic diversity.
One of the main manifestations of conflict based on culture and language is the
press and its reporting of the conflict. Communication media are thus central to any
consideration of ethnic intrastate conflict. Scholars of censorship, propaganda, and
conflict reporting have focused most of their attention on Western interstate
conflicts, particularly those in which the USA or UK are involved. Although there
are many theories about freedom of expression in a democratic society, to date there
has been little empirical data or theorising about propaganda and censorship in
intrastate conflicts in the developing world. This is a gap that we hope to help fill.
The ethnic basis of Sri Lanka’s civil war was largely a consequence of the
politicisation of ethnic politics by the British colonial regime. When British colonial
power was transferred in 1948, the minority Tamil-speaking community lost its
majority in the bureaucracy to the Sinhala-speaking community, exacerbating an
‘ethnic’ conflict that is based primarily on language issues. In 1956, Prime Minister
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike declared that Sinhala was to be the country’s official
language, an act felt by Tamils to be a denigration of their own tongue (Bureau of
South Asian Affairs, 2008). In 1948, Tamils were 18% of the population but held
30% of the positions in universities and professional jobs (Selvarajah, 2004, p. 5). By
introducing Sinhala as the official language and denying Tamils admissions to
professional education and government services, the government sought to re-
address the balance. In this sense, the present-day Sri Lanka conflict is similar to
other conflicts that have a base in language, for example, in the Basque country in
Spain, Tibet, Slovakia, and Romania, where minorities that had a language different
from that of the majority state were forcibly oppressed (Brown, 2001; Eichhorst,
2005).
Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon (Figure 1), has a history of free expression
dating back millennia and in the twentieth century has oftentimes enjoyed a free
press. Democratic rights such as freedom of expression are enshrined in the Sri
Lankan constitution. This study examines the national Sri Lankan press and
attempts to explain how it could circumvent censorship and at the same time act as a
forum for the exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. Our
analysis exposes how the newspapers of the three major language groups in Sri
Lanka contribute to a deeper understanding of the role of culture and language in
this conflict.
Sri Lanka is a multi-party parliamentary democracy with an executive president
as head of state and a head of armed forces and defence. Remarkably, Sri Lanka still
enjoys considerable stability despite high levels of political violence. Geographically
situated at the Southern tip of India, its 21 million people comprise four major ethnic
groups. Sinhalese make up 73.8% of the population, Sri Lankan Moors 7.2%, Indian
Tamil 4.6%, Sri Lankan Tamil 3.9%, others 0.5% (CIA, 2008). At 91%, Sri Lanka
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boasts the highest literacy rate in South Asia and has enjoyed universal suffrage since
1931. Sinhala speakers comprise 74% of the population, Tamil 18%, and other 8%.
English is commonly used in government and is spoken competently by about 10%
of the population (CIA, 2008). Most politically-aware people can read English plus
one of the other two. Very few people read both the Tamil and Sinhala press
together.
Sri Lanka is a collectivist society (Green, 2005; Niles, 1998) with a high-context
communication culture. ‘High context actions are by definition rooted in the past,
slow to change, and highly stable’ (Hall, 1976, p. 48). Furthermore, high-context
messages and communication strategies are embedded ‘in the physical context or
internalised in the person while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of
the message’ (Hall, 1976, p. 48). Sri Lanka is highly networked through both new
technologies but especially through centuries-old, slow and reliable traditional
communication channels (Ratner & Lumei, 2003). Its people are integrated into
cohesive in-groups welded by overlapping media systems in which community and
social goals are often more important than individual goals.
Further differentiating Sri Lanka is its unique social contract, one based on the
concepts of dharma (order in nature and life) and ahimsa (avoidance of violence).
These central precepts of Buddhist philosophy are ‘experiential and experimental,
built on individual perception and experiences, not necessarily on another’s
unverified word of his experience’ (Goonatilake, 2001, p. 16). Buddhist philosophy
encourages free discussion when deciding major issues (Gunaratne, 2005). There is a
special nuance that may not be familiar to citizens of a republic since the king holds
office by virtue of a ‘compassionate contract’ with his subjects. In the ‘Agganna
Sutta,’ the Buddha describes the origins of property and the state. As crime increased
after the division of the land, the people elected a king to maintain law and order,
paying him for his troubles (Pryor, 1991). The king has benevolent obligations
toward the people.
This compassionate contract contrasts with the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ social
contract theory, which demands that people, in exchange for ‘security’ and ‘freedom,’
Figure 1. Map of Sri Lanka.
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should give up certain rights and should accept legitimate and ultimate state
authority (‘the sovereign’) (Wikipedia, 2008). For example, the Sri Lankan social
contract does not allow the death penalty. Abstaining from the destruction of life
encourages the development of compassion. Treasuring the lives of those who have
not valued the lives of others is an act of spiritual courage. Known for centuries as an
island of tranquillity, Sri Lanka has only latterly exploded into a killing-field (Athas,
2003).
Media in context
Sri Lankan media form a web of relationships between public and commercial
entities, each with differing cultural norms but all within one grand social structure.
The actors in the Sri Lankan media social system (journalists, firms, military
officials, rebel communication bosses, and the printing and publishing industry) are
as powerful as any of the country’s other economic, legal, political, cultural systems.
These actors are social agents who play a ‘vital role in relation to core political values
of freedom of expression and democracy’ (Allern, 2002, p. 137). In this sense, we
agree with other authors that patterns of media behaviour stem from the ways in
which they are culturally influenced (Arno, 1984, p. 11; Murdoch, 1982, p. 118).
As Lahav (1985) points out, while they do regulate media, democratic nations do
not control their media, except during a state of emergency, during which military
censorship may be enforced (cited in Nossek & Limor, 2001). It was precisely a state
of emergency brought about by the conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, that brought about censorship
regulations in Sri Lanka. Under military censorship, the Sri Lankan media operated
in a social and legal netherworld. Reflecting dharma and ahimsa, their function was
to keep this highly networked society informed and stable, since they neither
reflected official views nor indeed countered them. Thus, the Sri Lankan media
suffered considerable wrath and reprisals (Athas, 2003, p. 7).
Present-day communication media in Sri Lanka are a legacy of British
colonialism. Unlike some developing countries, where the electronic media may
pre-dominate, the British left behind a country overshadowed by newspapers in
terms of opinion formation and information dissemination. Since independence
from Britain in 1948, this nation’s press has been skilful and critical, notes Wriggins
(1960), and it has enjoyed the reputation as ‘one of the freest and most vibrant in
Asia’ (Ratnatunge, 2003, p. 1). Even today, Sri Lanka has one of the largest
proportionate readerships in the world, where newspaper circulation far surpasses
the reach of television (Bates Media, 2004). Educational achievement and literacy
are highly correlated with newspaper-reading, while economic status and occupation
are also significantly associated (Samarasinghe, 1997).
British colonists introduced printing and publishing in 1839. English-language
newspapers in Sri Lanka date back to that era, but they have grown considerably in
size and power over the past two decades (de Beer & Merrill, 2004). By the early
twentieth century, there were 13 English-language newspapers. English is widely used
for education, scientific, and commercial purposes. Gunaratne and Wattegama
remark that ‘the English language press catered to and continues to deliver to a more
elite (English educated) group of readers (2000, p. 10), yet these papers failed to meet
Merrill and Fisher’s (1980) standards of an elite press.
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Since 1953, censorship has been applied periodically to national and interna-
tional media based on the island. It has been a periodic feature during the civil and
ethnic unrests in 1953, 1958, 1959, 1968, 1971, and during the period under review,
and it has been imposed by every government in power under the Public Security
Ordinance No. 25 of 1947. Press control first arose in the form of the Sri Lanka Press
Council Law No. 5 of 1973. Its enactment converted the Associated Newspapers of
Ceylon Limited into a state-owned enterprise.
Sinhalese (or Sinhala) is a language that belongs to the Indo-Aryan branch of the
Indo-European languages. The oldest existing literary works date from the 9th
century CE. Due to centuries of colonial rule, contemporary Sinhala contains many
loanwords from Portuguese, Dutch, and English. The first Sinhala language
newspaper Lankaloka was published in 1860 with assistance from the King of
Siam (today’s Thailand), and Sinhala newspapers gained increased circulation up
through independence. The early Sinhala press ‘exuded a remarkable pro-nationa-
listic and pro-Buddhist bias in contrast to the pro-Western, pro-Christian bias of the
English press’ (Gunaratne & Wattegama, 2000, p. 3). Post-independence Sinhala
newspapers have been known for their support of and sometimes bloody fights for
‘the improvement of journalism and safeguarding the freedom of the press’
(Wimalaratne, 2001, p. 5).
Tamil is a Dravidian language spoken predominantly by Tamil people of Sri
Lanka and parts of India. The oldest (1841) Tamil newspaper is Udaya Taraki and it
has a religious and ethno-nationalistic orientation, which today characterises the
Tamil press in general (Gunaratne, 1975). It increased circulation after 1948 and
today caters to indigenous Tamils, Indian Tamils, and the Tamil-speaking Muslim
community. The Tamil press supports national harmony but supports the aspirations
of the Tamil minority. This in no way means it champions the insurgency.
Four leading publishing houses dominate the island’s newspaper scene: Asso-
ciated Newspapers of Ceylon Limited (ANCL), Wijeya Newspapers Limited, Upali
Newspapers Limited, and Express Newspapers (Ceylon) Limited. All of these big
companies are based in Colombo, the capital, while a handful of Tamil publishing
houses are located in Jaffna, with circulation limited to that city. Three publishing
houses are proprietorships while the ANCL group is now a business undertaking of
the government. Ownership patterns have a significant impact on the ‘political
content of the main newspapers in all three languages’ mainly due to the regulatory
influences of the mid 1970s, notes Peiris (1997, p. 94).
The Sri Lankan military and the Tamil Tigers
Sri Lankan soldiers have long served under British military command, especially in
the Boer War and both World Wars. After colonialism, the Sri Lankan military was
transformed from a largely ceremonial force into a modern fighting army. Sri
Lankan troops now play a role in United Nations peacekeeping forces. The military
is organised into three branches: Army, Navy, and Air Force. Military expenditures
account for 2.6% of GDP (CIA, 2008). A military press spokesman is the official
voice of the defence establishment. Since independence, its primary mission has been
the targeting of armed groups within the country, most notably the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers.
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LTTE has engaged in a 25-year-long separatist conflict with the government,
although some say in 2009 that the government is close to putting an end to the
conflict (Belgian Export Credit Agency, 2009). The voice of the Tigers is their official
website, but it was not included in this study. The LTTE was founded in 1975 and
attracted many supporters, especially from youth dissatisfied with the government’s
attitudes towards solving Tamil concerns. In the beginning, it carried out low-key
attacks against various government targets, including policemen and local politi-
cians. Fighting continued throughout the 1990s, and was marked by suicide bombing
assassinations of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan
president Premadasa in 1993. By 2001, following the 11 September 2001 Al Qaeda
attacks on the USA, the LTTE unexpectedly dropped its demand for a separate state,
but in 2005 it resumed attacks against government troops and civilian targets. The
LTTE was made up of an amphibious warfare unit, an airborne group, a suicide
commando unit, and intelligence and political offices. A press office issued periodic
releases to the media and conducted briefings with journalists in Jaffna.
Research objective
The research objective of our study was to answer the question ‘How can we explain
conflict reporting under military censorship within the cultural and social context of
an Asian internal conflict in Sri Lanka?’ We examined two military campaigns.
Operation Jayasikurui (Victory Assured in Sinhala) lasted from 19971999. Its
primary objective was to establish a land route to the government-held Jaffna
peninsula (which had no land supply routes) through territory held by the LTTE by
linking the government-held towns of Vavuniya and Kilinochchi. At that time it was
the largest military operation undertaken by the Sri Lankan military. The Battle for
Elephant Pass focused on a narrow entrance to the Jaffna Peninsula. The Sri Lankan
Army in 2000 lost control of the Elephant Pass to the LTTE after a major military
defeat.
By analysing these two cases, and by identifying patterns of signification in
conflict reporting, this study aimed to investigate how the actors in the Sri Lankan
media social system reported the selected cases. We were interested in theorising
about one of the hallmarks of Sri Lankan conflict reporting, namely curious
techniques under which the press appeared to abide by the regulations but in reality
promoted a democratic and open press system. For each language we analysed
prominence, framing, similarities and differences, censorship circumvention techni-
ques, and the range of explanations advanced by the military and the journalists
regarding military censorship.
Literature review
We looked widely into the literature for models that might help explain the
phenomenon in question. Much of our search led to elite theory. Western (even
critical Western) propaganda theory takes the supremacy of elites as a foundation.
This is manifested in the theory of how Western media (including Russian media)
deal with military censorship in such places and Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, or
IsraelPalestine. To date, there has been little empirical data or theorising about
propaganda and censorship in internal conflicts within developing countries where
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elites are differently composed. Moreover, conflict reporting in a high-context
internal conflict has not been fully explored in existing literature.
According to one dominant school of propaganda theory, media symbolically
endorse official views and recognise the legitimacy of elites (Hallin, 1997). This belief
may come from the theological doctrines of early Christianity, which recognise and
extol the superiority of elites, their claims to superior knowledge, their rights to be
considered representatives of the community, and their entitlement to be above
politics, says Hallin (1997). As stated by Lasswell (1934) and Lippmann (1922),
public opinion theory (which forms the base for much of Western propaganda
theory) was elitist in nature. According to Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), elites interpret
media for the ‘masses’ through opinion leadership. Those people with most access to
media, and having a more literate understanding of media content, explain and
diffuse the content to others. This ‘two-step flow’ model required elites to interpret
to the masses.
Simpson (1994, p. 18) writes that these authors saw the press as an ‘instrument
for imposing one’s will on others, and preferably on masses of others.’ Simpson
further argues that communication for the purpose of domination (be it political or
commercial) has become a central component of communications theory. A
mainstream propaganda paradigm has evolved into an analysis of domination and
big power relations (e.g. the ‘embeddedness’ concept in Iraq). Mainstream theory
sees censorship as a struggle between the agents of social order and civil society
against the forces of absorption and suppression. Even the much vaunted social
responsibility theory of the press requires an ‘enforcer’ (i.e. the state) in its model.
Attempts have been made (e.g. Altschull, 1995; Hachten, 1996; Picard, 1985) to
revise the shortcomings of Siebert’s (1956) Four theories of the press, especially the
defects of social responsibility theory. Recapping these attempts, McQuail (1994,
p. 133) points out that ‘in most countries the media do not constitute any single
‘‘system’’ with a single purpose or philosophy, but are composed of many separate,
overlapping, often inconsistent elements, with appropriate differences of normative
expectation and actual regulation.’ True enough, but McQuail does not mention the
pivotal word ‘culture,’ essential for a propaganda model of Third World internal
conflict.
Other propaganda models also contribute little to the analysis of internal conflict
in the developing world. First, there is the question of who is ‘official.’ Herman and
Chomsky’s (1988) model shows how media stamp legitimacy on official views and
how the structure of the media compels media owners (and media workers for that
matter) to comply with this or that prevailing ideology. Hall et al. (1978) describe
how official sources will dominate over non-official sources in most reporting events.
Hallin’s (1984, 1986, 1997) model shows how media legitimise official views, which in
turn perpetuate the dominant political ideology, even while at the same time allowing
the media to exhibit ‘journalistic objectivity’ through such widely accepted notions
as spheres of consensus, legitimate controversy, and deviance.
Western theory goes on to condemn ‘media corporations.’ Hallin and Mancini
(2004) outlined a Eurocentric ‘North Atlantic Corporatist Model’ and a ‘Polarised
Pluralist Model,’ but these are limited to the North Atlantic countries and possibly
the Mediterranean and southern European countries. Here again a Western model
falls short as media corporations in Sri Lanka are small by comparison and the
newspapers are not necessarily polarised. Another Western propaganda model
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(Wolfsfeld, 1997) views the press role in conflict as a political contest, a kind of
competition between antagonists for political control. This does not take into
consideration a scenario of media competition not for political control but as an
alliance to outmanoeuvre the controls.
One problem for theory is that elites keep shifting in Sri Lanka. From before
independence until the mid-sixties, as Singer (1964, 1996) describes, the ‘Ceylonese’
elite were largely Western-educated, English-speaking ‘gentlemen,’ whose ranks were
heavily over-represented by Tamils. Sinhalese penetration into the elite classes
represented by civil service, business, or the professions is now in full force. Imtiyaz
(2006) shows how competitive elites employ symbolic politics, including the press, on
behalf of elite mobilisation and consolidation. In Sri Lanka, it is not always possible
to tell who is giving elite views. Is it the government, whose machinations are well
understood and interpreted in the newspapers? Is it the media themselves (owners/
publishers or journalists)? Is it the ‘official briefings’ of the Army and the LTTE? Or
is it broad civil society networks?
The Sri Lankan conflict is quite different from conflicts which Western theorists
have used to build their cases. It is not cross-border. It has no international
dimension. Its mediascape is very different from the West. The Sri Lankan conflict is
not easily categorised as the imposition of elite ideology, nor is there the
characteristic monopoly elite control. Even a ‘terrorist’ organisation is treated as
an elite, and elites are not necessarily the governing strata as there are many
overlapping and competing elites in Sri Lankan society. Nor does ‘one newspaper
stands out as an organ of elite opinion’ (Lerner, Pool, & Lasswell, 1951). In Sri
Lanka there are many elite newspapers divided by language and class that represent
competitive and antagonistic social forces.
One recurring theme in these Western studies about developing world conflict is
the rise of a class whom Lasswell and Lerner (1965) referred to as ‘world
revolutionary elites’ and ‘coercive ideologues.’ Their rise was due not to a reaction
to ‘capitalism and its vices’ but to the disintegration of monarchic, dictatorial, and/
or colonial regimes (Lerner, 1951). Lasswell’s assertion (1965, p. 85) that the ‘major
transformation’ of our time is ‘the rise of intellectuals to effective power’ is
complicated in Sri Lanka by the fact that there is a considerable degree of overlap
between the intellectual and military elite, a pattern also recognised in the literature
(Johnson, 1962; Kautsky, 1962).
As our findings emerged, we began to seek another model to explain conflict
reporting within censorship in Sri Lanka. We stand more with Altschull (1995) who
believes that journalism perpetuates value systems that pre-dominate in a society. He
observes that press systems are representatives of the people and they exercise
political and economic power. Moreover, social reality is in part the product of
human perception and depends on one’s status in a social system, past practice, and
culture (Hall, 1976). We argue that the social contract for journalists within the Sri
Lankan cultural context is influenced and shaped by the shared cultural meanings
within that ‘networked’ community. Such an interpersonal network of sources is
demonstrated by Dissanayake (1986) in his account of the 1971 Sri Lankan
insurrection. This concept of ‘network’ is not at all what Castells (1996), p. 3) called
the ‘bipolar opposition of the Net and the self’ but more about ‘openness and
collaboration across . . . boundaries and about building multiple relationships for
mutual benefit’ (Skyrme, 1999, p. 37).
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As Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue, it is crucial to understand the nature of the
state, the systems of political parties, and other related elements of the social
structure before one can understand the media. Winfield, Mizuno, and Beaudin
(2000) are critical of studies that do not examine ‘historical philosophies of other
civilizations’ as they believe that ‘truth, hierarchy and group are indirectly linked to
mass media and freedom of expression.’ They argue that ‘the characteristics of a
country’s media depend on the culture in which they operate’ (Winfield et al., 2000,
p. 329). Even Siebert (1956) believed it necessary to examine the social systems in
which the Western press functioned. More to the point, Dissanayake (1986) explores
the links between communication theories and other ontologies, for example Taoism
and Ch’an Buddhism. We therefore see the social and cultural context as an
important element in assessing how the media work.
It is not new to say that the ‘Four Theories of the Press’ paradigm has limited
validity and may not explain how the press operates in other contexts. This goes for
propaganda theory as well as other areas of media scholarship. The problem is their
exclusive focus on Western social systems. Moreover, much of the literature on the
media is highly ethnocentric, referring only to single country experience but written
in broader terms. Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Arno and Dissanayake (1984)
argue that the press coverage is basically ‘stories about conflict’ and that journalists
use elemental, even archetypal, storylines to portray it. We sought to go beyond the
notion of the press as storytellers of conflict. With Esser and Pfetsch (2004), our view
is that there are deeper nuances at work than simply storylines and that the storyline
perspective may actually confound analysis.
It is our contention that conventional theories of press censorship and control
may come up short in a country such as Sri Lanka, where there are no media
conglomerates, where television is not the dominant news medium, and where media
are so deeply suffused by cultural values. The analysis of the cases in this study,
together with the theoretical model proposed, respond in part to the statement above
that in Sri Lanka freedom of the press is shaped by shared cultural meanings. We
hope to make a contribution to the literature by examining deep-text structures in
relation to free press and censorship that may be obscured by dominant propaganda
models.
Methodology
We undertook an interpretive analysis of censorship and conflict reporting to reveal
underlying dynamics that might explain internal conflict reporting under military
censorship in Sri Lanka. Our data sources were: (1) in-depth face-to-face interviews
with journalists, government, and military officials in Sri Lanka; (2) compiled textual
data from newspapers in three languages; and (3) secondary data comprising
legislation and other archival documents and memos from public and private
sources. The newspapers in our sample are standard broadsheets selected because of
their high circulation figures and national reach. They are the Ceylon Daily News
and the Sunday Times (two English newspapers); Lankadeepa and Silumina (two
Sinhala newspapers); Veerakesari and the Sunday Veerakesari (two Tamil news-
papers). These are the six leading newspapers in the country; two from each of the
three language groups, and representing the three leading publishing houses.
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Drawing upon Holsti (1969), we carried out a multi-stage sampling procedure of
newspaper texts within the sampling years of 1997 to 2000. A purposive sampling
month (with military activity) was selected for each of the four sample years. Within
this frame, our sample yielded 341 articles: 106 in Sinhala, 68 in Tamil, and 167 in
English.
We then carried out in-depth interviews with three senior military officers directly
involved with these operations with authority to disseminate or censor information,
four newspaper journalists who directly covered the conflicts, and a cabinet minister
who was responsible for the regulatory environment. This purposive sampling
procedure was corroborated by the interviewees themselves, who named each other
not knowing they were already earmarked as participants. For reasons of
confidentiality and security, these interviews were held without attribution; however
informed consent was obtained from all participants, who extended their fullest
cooperation for this study.
We thus used a multi-method analysis:
. Quantitative content analysis of newspaper content cross-tabulated with
independent variables such as date, case, and source;
. Qualitative content analysis of frames, adjectival valence, and other manifest
elements;
. Qualitative analysis using in-depth interviews of government, journalistic, and
military actors;
. Secondary analysis of archival and legislative data.
Normally, content analysis can only be applied to manifest content; that is, the
words, sentences, or texts themselves, rather than their deeper meanings (if they are
different). Yet we agree with Jensen (2002), that manifest content of newspaper
journalist reportage is also a ‘vehicle of cultural forms and historical world views.’
Thus, using external validation from our in-depth interviews, we examined latent or
deep-text structures within the sample. To ascertain external validity, results of the
content analysis were compared to interview data to assess and compare the range of
explanations advanced by the respondents.
We devised and pilot-tested a content analysis instrument with twenty thematic
categories. Three trained coders analysed the texts. Their Scott’s pi, the statistical
tool to measure inter-coder reliability for nominal data in content analysis of
communication texts was .87 for the thematic categories. Using frequency of mention
or occurrence, we looked at the framing of the event (how news defines and
constructs a political event) (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997) and used (1) conflict,
(2) consensus, (3) problem/solution, and (4) multiple frames. Chi-square x2
tabulations were carried out across newspaper type and across sample years to
assess the significance of relationships. The results of the content analysis were also
cross-tabulated with the independent variables in search of significant relationships.
Results
According to the respondent journalists, the government viewed the media as a
second enemy after the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). Media controls were brought into force
after two types of ‘anti-military’ stories appeared. These were exposure of military
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corruption pertaining to procurements, and the revelation that military operations
were carried out under political direction. Our military and political respondents, by
contrast, declared that it was ‘irresponsible journalism’ that prompted the censorship
regulations. Whatever the reasons, the government appointed a so-called Competent
Authority (CA) to regulate media content. Although the Supreme Court declared
the CA null and void on a legal technicality, government re-imposed it, one CA each
for the Sinhala, Tamil, and English press. The CA required journalists to submit
copy before publication. There was no such CA in zones of war, so this proved
advantageous, especially for Tamil publications.
Respondents articulated a number of underlying structures to military censorship
that one could describe as latent dimensions going beyond the surface content of the
newspapers. Censorship was not applied continuously, fairly, or evenly due to both
infrastructural and political circumstances. All respondents agreed that one major
reason explained the threats and covert controls by the military, namely censorship
as a guise for personal and political agendas, not only for political domination or
military victory.
Restrictions on newsprint were widespread, they reported, and this especially
affected Tamil publishing houses, where journalists ran out of supplies, batteries,
printing paper, and ink. Although military media had been trained in psychological
operations, they had not been trained in the professional dissemination of
information to the press. Military press officers even flouted the protection of their
own censorship regime. As one said: ‘we never hoodwinked the public, but we didn’t
tell the whole truth either.’ Besides, ‘there was no policy or guidelines regarding
media briefings,’ observed another general. This led to sometimes chaotic situations
in the briefing room.
It is interesting that within this highly volatile and cultural context, journalists
nonetheless used tried-and-tested news gathering and validation methods. For
corroboration they depended on networks and sources that they assiduously
cultivated in their family and work lives. Journalists’ sources included even the
military themselves (‘because we were school friends’). Acquaintanceship networks
(e.g. Gurevich, 1961), even with the enemy, could be used to verify or disprove
official news. What they may have lacked in journalistic objectivity, these practices
guaranteed credibility in the eyes of the audience, the ultimate arbiter of journalistic
integrity. Tamil and English journalists even cultivated and gained access to highest
levels in the Tamil Tigers. However, language was a barrier for Sinhala journalists to
do the same.
Remarkable in conflict reporting in Sri Lanka, summarising our respondents, are
the censorship circumvention techniques that were used. Throughout the entire
sample periods, none of the publishing houses was prosecuted for violation of
censorship regulations. Moreover, journalists maintained that they were both
expressing freedom of information and communication and acting independently
from their owners and editors. Also curious was the fact that the military never
actually disputed the journalists’ reporting. Rather than acting as adversaries,
military officials were concerned about their own credibility and cultivated trust with
journalists to forge a close working relationship.
The three sampled language groups of newspapers had many significant
differences with x2 (3, N  341)  p B .05 and revealed a high internal consistency
amongst English, Sinhala, and Tamil newspapers despite the apparent differentiation
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in how they circumvented the censor. Even though their goals were the same, each
press system used a unique constellation of techniques based upon cultural and
historical circumstances.
Censored space
The Sinhala press ceded only .01% of its manifest content to the censor, while Tamil
papers ceded 1% to the cut. While English-language newspapers gave up a much
higher rate (3%) to the censor, they often ‘published’ censored coverage by printing
blank column-inches or even full blank pages indicating that they were subject to
the censor’s cut. Readers were able to ‘read’ or infer the content based upon the
context of the blank space and their holistic understanding of the culture and the
conflict.
Story treatment
Chi-square indicates a significant relationship between paper type and story
treatment, which we operationalised as three ‘types’ of newspaper coverage: straight
news, feature stories, or commentary/criticism. All samples record high levels for
straight news of the war; Sinhala and English at 58% and 56%, respectively, and
Tamil a high of 66%. Censors insisted on high levels of objective war reporting;
unbeknownst to them, according to our respondents, another level of circumvention
was going on. As one Sinhala journalist quipped: ‘of course we were never allowed to
incorporate our own opinion in war news reportage, but we educated the public
through commentary and feature articles about how to read the straight news.’
Censorship regulations were spelt out in a way that enabled them to write hard news
stories while using the other types of writing to educate the public on how to analyse
these stories. ‘People knew what we were writing about,’ explained a Tamil and a
Sinhala journalist.
News themes
Political implications of the conflict emerged as the most common theme while the
human consequence of conflict was second across all samples. Contrary to the best
efforts of the censor, reporting on government military operations fell behind. This is
not what was anticipated by the censor, according to our sources. Media policy (e.g.
about freedom of expression) was not covered in the Sinhala and Tamil press, but
was a significant theme in the English language press (Figure 2).
Framing
How an article is framed was significantly different amongst the papers. Our coders
analysed whether a story was presented within the conflict frame (e.g. military
operations) or the consensus frame (e.g. government peace initiatives). Conflict
frames were the most frequent, at 59% in the Sinhala and Tamil texts, but at only
20% in the English samples. Consensus frames were almost entirely absent. Our
respondents indicated that the use of conflict frames can overcome bias towards
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official viewpoints based upon the predispositions of the readers. By predisposition
we take this to mean the language and culture of each readership community.
Points of view
We found a significant difference between language type and viewpoint. We
operationalised this as whether the news article presented: (1) a mix of points of
views; (2) mostly one view; (3) only one view; or (4) an editorial view. Then we
corroborated these findings with our interview respondents. Categories 2 and 3
predominated in the Tamil and Sinhala press. The Tamil press had 46% ‘mostly one
view’ as they constantly reflected the aspirations of the Tamil people. ‘All one view’
of 67% in the Sinhala sample was largely an unremitting sympathy for the suffering
of the public. Editorial views are a high 23% in the English sample, and can be seen
as opinion which did not bother the CA. This is evidence of differing yardsticks used
by the censor, as elucidated by respondent journalists.
Source transparency
Cross-checking of multiple sources can ensure greater journalistic objectivity, so we
were interested to see whether and how many news sources were attributed in the
straight news content. In the eyes of a public that is suspicious of censorship, multi-
source confirmation adds credibility to the story, avoids pre-dominance of official
views, and allows the press to present more neutrality. Our sampled texts quoted a
vast number of unnamed multiple sources. The occurrence of multiply-sourced
stories was similar in all three samples.
News actors
There is a significant relationship among the paper types and news actor, whom we
operationalised as: (1) government officials; (2) politicians; (3) public actors; (4)
military; (5) Tamil Tigers; and (6) clergy/monks (Figure 3). The leading actors in the
Figure 2. Thematic categories by paper sample.
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Sinhala and Tamil press were public actors, primarily civil society actors. The
English press emphasised politicians and the military, wherein participant generals
figured prominently. The Chief Censor also figured prominently as the single most
quoted official actor resulting in significance among the paper types and news actors.
It is important to add that limelight on politicians or the military does not mean
‘elite’ in the Sri Lankan context, added our respondents.
Keyword-In-Context
In the Keyword-In-Context (KWIC) analysis, we look at certain key actors or
concepts (keywords) and examined the 40-character linguistic window on either side
in search of adjectives or adverbs that had a positive or negative valence. Fourteen
different positive descriptors for the military and 20 for the LTTE were identified
across all samples. This can be attributed to the cultural landscape where inter-
positioning of adjectives is an art in vernacular language use. One interesting
example was that none of the newspapers gave a negative valence to Velupillai
Prabhakaran, the LTTE founder and leader. Instead, KWIC analysis revealed that
he was addressed in respectful terms, such as Tiger supremo, LTTE leader, and
Supreme leader, something which would likely deviate from Western-style coverage of
a ‘terrorist.’ The deep philosophy of ahimsa and tolerance led the press to report in
the interest of the wider community, steer clear of sensationalisation, and avoid
untoward animosity towards any community. After all, as even the military
respondents put it, ‘we are fighting our own people.’ The press fully endorsed this
and especially elevated public actors.
Political implications
Political implications of the conflict emerged as the most frequent theme across the
sampled newspapers, contrary to the censor’s efforts that government military
operations should take the top position. Within this category, the Sinhala press was
preoccupied with subcategories of terrorism (35%) and issues of solutions (29%).
Military operations and the question of a separate state were observed much less
frequently through the sample period. The Tamil press put the issue of solutions at
40%, while mentions of a separate state were observed in 31% of the sample. Chi-
square tests showed association of language type and terrorism as a theme. For
Figure 3. Actors by paper sample.
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example, the Tamil press did not mention terrorism but rather focused on solutions
and a separate state throughout the sample period. English-language press pondered
military directions in 46% of the articles, while solutions counted 25%.
Consequences of conflict
The Sinhala press viewed victims of the conflict in 25% of the articles, and
destruction of life and property at 22%, and civil society at 20%. Tamil newspapers
emphasise victims of conflict at 38%, the highest occurrence across all samples for
any category. Destruction of life and property accounted for 21% in the Tamil press,
while human rights and civil society received equal emphasis. The English press
examined the impact of civil society in 28% of the articles and at victims of conflict in
27%. In all newspapers, the ‘social’ side dominated over the governmental or military
side.
The results confirm interview data that the three media groups (both private and
government-run) reported the conflict in two ways. While there was always an ethnic
orientation based upon culture and language, there was also tolerant, consensus-
building perspective. They ‘did not sensationalise and always felt the pulse of the
people,’ according to the respondents. While the Sri Lankan press delivered differing
platforms of conflict news to their individual audiences, they passed no judgments
but simply elucidated the status quo and its spillover effects to the public without
undue propaganda for governmental military efforts.
Discussion
The differences and unique cultural attributes of conflict reporting in Sri Lanka lead
us to diverge from previous theorising on propaganda and the press. There are no big
international powers involved. It is not cross-border. As we have indicated in the
literature survey, the concept of ‘elites’ in Sri Lanka is problematic. There is a
considerable overlap between the intellectual and military elites. A ‘terrorist’
organisation is treated with respectful adjectival descriptions. The conflict is not
about a weak state, the economy, or modernisation.
Our findings reveal that conflict reporting in Sri Lanka under conditions of
military censorship has a curious way of circumventing censorship while in part
obeying it. This is due to unique high-context cultural communication characteristics
shared at a deeper level by all Sri Lankans regardless of ethnicity or language. A
press system accustomed for decades to freedom of expression can appear to bow to
the censor’s cut while at the same time promoting democratic and open media. To
this extent, we believe, the internal Sri Lankan conflict is different from conflicts that
have served previous propaganda theorists as cases.
We sought to explain the Sri Lankan conflict and its media framework through
a novel propaganda model. We came upon the metaphor of the Catherine Wheel
(Figure 4) as a metaphor and model to explain censorship and the press in
developing world internal conflicts. Legend has it that Catherine of Alexandria, a
Christian saint and noted scholar in the early 4th century, was executed on a large
wooden wagon wheel with radial spokes. Used as well for centuries as pyrotechnic
displays, the modern Catherine Wheel consists of powder-filled spiral tubes
mounted with a pin through its centre. Each Catherine Wheel contains a unique
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composition of colour, sound, and strength. When ignited, it rotates at varying
rates and display sparks and flame until it is expended. No two manufacturers
produce the same Catherine Wheel as they are packed by hand using varying
explosive materials. Yet each Catherine Wheel aims to be visually and aurally
consumed.
To us, this novel model allowed us to explain metaphorically a great deal about
Sri Lankan conflict reporting in times of censorship. The opening impulse of news
and information, the powder so to speak, is lit by particularly by a particular event
from the military or the rebels. Journalists present this as multi-sourced conflict
news, building radials in a wheel. Other sources such as politicians and the militants
themselves, ignited by this initial event discharge, add momentum to the news
production process until the whole system begins to spin, overcomes inertia, and
then revolves uncontrollably. Sparks spill out, which the public perceives as ‘content.’
Rarely is any powder trapped (it is all released) after ignition in this revolving,
volatile environment. The sparks are a representation of the physical nature of the
system, not the physical system itself. The system is so explosive and unpredictable
that no single force such as censorship can control it.
We see censorship in Sri Lanka as a give-and-take amongst the parties in the
media social system intertwined by the cultural context. Moreover, as one
respondent general observed: ‘it is too difficult to curb the flow of information
in this small country through official press releases.’ All the military participants in
this study agreed with the statement: ‘We are fighting our own people.’ The press
had empathy with all sides, even with the military. As another general put it: ‘The
public has a right to know because at the end of the day, the soldier, sailor, airman
and policeman who are fighting belongs to the people. They are somebody’s son,
somebody’s, daughter, somebody’s husband or somebody’s brother; they have a
right to know.’ Even the censor too sensed these sentiments. This content analysis
supported by expert interviews presents evidence of a genuine public discourse that
demanded a kind of press independence and objectivity under censorship of
conflict reporting in Sri Lanka that is in part explained through a novel visual
model.
Figure 4. Catherine Wheel Model of Censorship Circumvention.
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Implications of research
There are several thoughts that emerged from this research that may enlighten future
researchers of conflict reporting both in the Western developed world and within the
developing world context such as in Sri Lanka. In our study, we noted the
inapplicability of certain Western propaganda models and have proposed a novel
model, the Catherine Wheel Model of Censorship Circumvention that is more
explanatory and predictive of the situation in Sri Lanka. We noted certain
deficiencies in existing models. Western propaganda theory assumes, in our view,
the superiority of elites and their claims to superior knowledge. In addition, the
Western concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy also encounter problems as the ruler
holds office by virtue of a contract with his subjects, core Sri Lankan philosophy that
sharply influences its culture.
Herman and Chomsky (1988) (‘the media are bent by demands of the state’) did
not apply since the Sri Lankan media did not so much mobilise elite programmes as
optimise the opportunity to reinforce a public agenda of conciliation and consensus
and to try to prevent disobedient interests (i.e. the military and the rebels) from
creating confusion, misunderstanding, and apathy in the public. Structural factors
such as elite ownership, powerful behind-the-scenes funds, influential advertising,
and psy-ops flak as envisaged by other models were absent. Anti-communist
ideology was not applicable as Sri Lanka is a firmly non-aligned country. There was
no apparent evidence of powerful business and government entities exerting
influence over the flow of information. Media in the Sri Lankan internal conflict
did not endow elites with symbols of legitimacy. Sri Lankan newspapers also did not
appear to be constrained by a hegemonic model of a dominant political ideology.
Our findings suggest that the dominant ideology, if there is one, is the search for an
ultimate solution on all sides within a consensus framework. Nor did the sphere of
consensus or sphere of legitimate controversy concepts of Hallin (1997) apply.
Wolfsfeld’s political contest model did not fit these results. One could argue that it is
just the reverse: official voices have become marginalised.
This study noted with interest the recurrent manifestations of freedom of
expression by all sides even under censorship within the cultural context of the Sri
Lankan internal conflict. For both publishers and journalists, the debate over
freedom of expression and censorship was an expression of the colonial legacy that
advocated truth-seeking through thought and writing. The military also operated
within this ideology.
We stand with Gunaratne’s (2005) observation that Western press theories are
‘anchored solely on Western philosophical and political theory.’ Gunaratne (2005,
p. 128) goes on to say that ‘researchers rarely analyze the content of indigenous
media, which generally adhere to Buddhist values of their audience.’ Gunaratne also
wrote that ‘to ascertain the degree of freedom of opinion-outlets and expression...
one has to focus on three levels  the world system, the nation-state, and the
individual’ (Gunaratne, 2001). We also reaffirm Dissanayake (1986) that it is
opportune to rethink the nature of communication theory from a comparative
perspective for two reasons. First, we need to widen the field of discourse and
facilitate the emergence of new insights from various cultures that enable us to
comprehend and conceptualise better, the act of communication. Second, commu-
nication research is largely guided by the social context in which it operates and is
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influenced by the cultural ethos which sustains it. The basic socio-cultural distinction
is that of independent individual in the Western sense and the individual-within-
networks in the Eastern sense.
This study has demonstrated that media behaviour under times of conflict and
censorship may not be uniform across the globe. Therefore, as stressed by Hallin
(1997, p. 206), media studies must connect to general social theory in order to
generalise political culture and social ideology. Further, as expressed by Kaplan
(1964), a theory should emerge as ‘the device for interpreting, criticizing and unifying
established laws, modifying them to fit data unanticipated in their formulation
and guiding the enterprise of discovering new and more powerful generalizations’
(p. 295). Moreover, we believe that social reality is subject to human perception. It
depends on the subject or activity, the situation, one’s status in a social system, past
experiences and culture, as theorised by Hall (1976). As such we see the importance
of assessing the social context to understand how news media work in a particular
society and were compelled to design a novel metaphor or theoretical model to
explain these differences.
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